Perhaps an avenue where Pascalians might better apply their resources is in preventing human-type punishers of a more bland variety from gaining access to simulation capabilities. For instance, Pascalians might form an organization with the mission of identifying and defusing attempts by sadists to acquire power and computational resources with which they could create hell simulations. A friend of mine put it this way:
if somebody says "i'm gonna make me an AI that'll turn turn the earth into hell, with fires everywhere and demons with little pitchforks", you could say to them "no, don't do that" or maybe pay somebody else to build a good AI instead, that sort of thing. Become a vigilante and hunt down evil techno-prophets with a sawed-off shotgun, not that there are any evil techno-prophets. But I suppose you could keep an eye out.Since Christian and Islamic fundamentalists are in fact some of the people most likely to support turning the earth into hell with fires and demons, there might be value in aiming to take away power from such organizations. This could include simply trying to reduce the number of people who ideologically support the notion of eternal punishment.
This last point almost turns Pascal's wager on its head. Obeying a punishing god -- or a malevolent ruler of any type -- is basically adopting the stance, "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." But if those malevolent powers may themselves originate from groups of humans who can be stopped, maybe you can "beat 'em" after all. (Of course, I don't think it's necessarily impossible to take action against the ideology of eternal torture while simultaneously trying to submit to some sort of deity who imposes it, even if the situation is a bit awkward.)
I write all of this partly as an update to my thinking and partly in response to the following email that I received. The author has given me permission to reproduce his/her text anonymously; it comprises the quoted sections below. I've interspersed my own replies.
Since I have read your essays about hell, my worldview has changed dramatically. I think it is important to find out much about possible hell-punishers even if we risk finitive losses. But I have one problem with Pascalian reasoning: Ignoring all evidence of agnosticism and always assuming the worst.Thanks for the interesting point.
Just suppose we have immortal souls. To experience a totally god or bad version of the hereafter say heaven and hell is only one (or a few) possibilities among ambivalent or less extreme forms of the afterlife (LEFA).
What if we make ourselves unhappy for a lifetime by thinking about hell and beeing afraid of, then die and with high probability not going to hell but to heaven or most likely to the LEFA where there is nothing to despair but also not to rejoice. If we continue to despair ourselves by pascalian reasoning and we live forever in the LEFA (of course we could still go to hell but the probability that we would exactly do what makes us avoid hell (and not the opposite!) is quite low) we would make ourselves suffer infinitively and create our own "hell in heaven". Of course you can't say that heaven or LESA with the fear of hell is as bad as the worst forms of hell themselves but the second thing is far more likely. So perhaps pascalian reasoning is in the utilitarian view the worst thing you can do to yourself.
This argument would be invalid if in heaven or in the LESA we had no influence on our own feelings but this may even be so on earth.
Surely it would be much worse to be in hell than living my egoistic pascalian life on earth or in the LESA but it is already bad enough that I want to die, what I am not trying to do because of the fear of hell.I'm very sorry to hear that! However, I can't say the feeling is unfamiliar: Life under religious fundamentalism is very often not worth living.
Maybe I should rather care about the earthly problems than making my mind up about hell. Certainly, I would become less selfish if I wouldn't always fear to loose time, energy that could be used to calm the hell-punisher.You're right to point out that Pascalian obedience is fundamentally selfish. For instance, if fundamentalist Catholicism were true, the most altruistic response might be to disobey god in an attempt to reduce the number of births as much as possible -- perhaps by promoting contraception in non-Catholic countries.
Always when I think I should do something because I could go to hell if I failed to do it, I revolt against the order of my rationality by doing nothing and excuse myself by suddenly believing in fate. If I didn't fear hell I had also some positive motives as self-confidence and enjoyment to develop my talents and my willpower. If I wouldn't always ignore every worldview without an avoidable hell I could more likely find out what God is like (what does not mean you can't be punished eternally for not doing so) or I could maybe even adhere to a religion (I was a Christian until I considered if Islam was more likely) or something like that (I pray to a religionless deity every day for universal salvation but actually I DON'T HAVE FATITH).Wow, I can sympathize completely -- fear of religion is indeed painful. And I completely know what you mean about praying to a religionless diety for universal salvation. :)
I hope things get better for you. Take care!
In what way is concern for preventing the creation of suffering-sims "Pascalian"? I expected some connection to evidential decision theory, in that hunting down those who would create such sims would somehow lower the probability that we live in such a sim.
ReplyDeleteIn what way is concern for preventing the creation of suffering-sims "Pascalian"? I expected some connection to evidential decision theory, in that hunting down those who would create such sims would somehow lower the probability that we live in such a sim.
ReplyDeleteI suppose I neglected to think perfectly carefully about what I meant there. But yes, you said precisely what I was thinking. If we, say, adopted evidential decision theory, and if we thought that fundamentalist simulators might have a proclivity for re-simulating their rise to victory in the pre-singularity world, then we would hate to find it the case that religious extremists gain access to simulation resources, because that would increase our subjective probability of being in the rise-to-victory sim.
From the perspective of timeless decision theory, the idea might be expressed as follows: I want it to be the case that instances of my cognitive algorithm decide to take action to prevent the rise to power of hell-and-brimstone supporters, because that will then logically imply that copies of my algorithm have acted in that way elsewhere in the multiverse.
I'm not a decision-theory expert, so I may have gotten some things wrong here. Other readers, do feel free to correct me.
Thanks. That makes it clear.
ReplyDelete-Jesper
From Paul Almond's article "On Causation and Correlation - Part 2: Implications of Evidential Decision Theory" (pp. 11-12):
ReplyDelete"One way in which evidential decision theory would be relevant is in the way it allows
you to control the probability that you are in a simulation in the first place. If your
civilization decides to develop the capability to run simulated realities, then you are
meta-causing civilizations in general to do likewise (including civilizations on which our
own might be modeled), and making it less likely that almost all civilizations end before
they are capable of producing simulated realities, in turn making it more likely that you
are in a simulated reality. If, however, your civilization decides not to acquire this
capability then you are meta-causing civilizations in general to do likewise, making it less likely that you are in a simulated reality. Once your civilization has the capability to
produce simulated realities, if your civilization decides to do it, this would make it more
likely that other civilizations also do it, again making it more likely that you are in a
simulated reality. On the other hand, if your civilization decides not to produce
simulated realities, this makes it less likely that other civilizations would choose to do
so, and therefore less likely that you are in a simulated reality yourself. [...]
"Evidential decision theory is not restricted to the issue of whether we are in a simulated
reality. If we are in a simulated reality, it might be relevant in allowing us to control the
probabilities that we are in various kinds of simulation. If we construct many simulated
realities in which various things happen, then if another civilization is simulating us, we
might be meta-causing it to make those things happen to us. This creates an argument
for being kind to the inhabitants of any simulated realities that you do make."